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11 Introduction
The idea of this paper is very simple. Data on nominal and real (inﬂation indexed) interest
rates is combined with survey data on inﬂation expectations to construct a quarterly time
series of “total premium” (inﬂation risk premium plus the difference between nominal
and real liquidity premia) for the sample 1997Q1–2008Q2. This time series is then re-
gressed on proxies for liquidity premia and measures of inﬂation and output uncertainty
(from survey data on probability distributions). The results indicate that the regressors are
signiﬁcant and explain a considerable fraction of the movements of the total premium.
Several studies have made use of real interest rates, liquidity premia or survey data,
but very few (if any) have combined them to have data on all the key ingredients of a
modern Fisher equation.
Reschreither (2004), Chen, Liu, and Cheng (2005) and D’Amico, Kim, and Wei
(2008) use nominal and real interest rates to estimate no-arbitrage yield curve models
with latent (unobservable) factors. The current paper instead estimates a simple yield
curve model using only observable factors that measure beliefs of economic agents: sur-
vey measures of inﬂation and output uncertainty and disagreement. It is potentially very
important to have direct measures of subjective market beliefs—since it allows us to sepa-
rate the issue of the economic theory about the inﬂation risk premium from that of rational
expectations/small sample problems. A particular strength of the survey data used in the
current paper is that it allows us to calculate explicit measures of both uncertainty and
disagreement.
Lahiri, Teigland, and Zaporowski (1988) and García and Manzanares (2007) also use
survey data to estimate inﬂation uncertainty (and even skewness/kurtosis). The former
paper does not ﬁnd any effect of uncertainty on nominal interest rates (on the sample
1969–1986), but García and Manzanares (2007) ﬁnd that it is important for understand-
ing the inﬂation scares during the Volcker period in the early 1980s. The current paper
differs from these earlier contributions in many details (in particular, on how to estimate
uncertainty from survey data), but more importantly by focusing on the period when real
(inﬂation indexed) interest rates are available (since 1997Q1). This allows for controlling
for one potentially important driving force of nominal rates.
Carlstrom and Fuerst (2004) and Shen (2006) compare the “break-even inﬂation rate”
(the difference between the nominal and real yields) to survey measures of inﬂation ex-
2pectations. They argue that the break-even inﬂation rates are too low—due to a consid-
erable liquidity premium in the observed real rates. The current paper incorporates those
results—andgoesontostudyifotherfactors(inﬂationandoutputuncertainty/disagreement)
add explanatory value.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 derives a modern Fisher equation;
section 3 discusses the data and the estimation approach; section 4 presents the empirical
results and section 5 concludes.
2 The Fisher Equation
This section presents the theoretical foundation of my empirical approach. A utility func-
tion with constant relative risk aversion gives the following ﬁrst order condition for an
investor’s investment in a nominal bond with interest rate i
1 D  Eexp.i      c/; (1)
where  is the time discount rate, E the (conditional) expectation; the inﬂation rate, 
the risk aversion and c the consumption growth. Notice that i    is the real return
on the bond. To simplify the notation, time subscripts are suppressed. The ﬁrst order
condition for a real bond (without liquidity risk) is similar: substitute the real interest rate
on a real bond without liquidity risk (Q r) for i   .
If i      c has a normal distribution, then the ﬁrst order conditions for a nom-
inal and a real bond (without liquidity risk) can be combined to write the inﬂation risk
premium as
i   Q r   E D   Cov.;c/   Var./=2; (2)
where E is expected inﬂation, Cov./ denotes a covariance and Var./ a variance. This
expression shows that the inﬂation risk premium on a nominal bond equals a covariance
term plus a Jensen’s inequality term. A negative covariance between inﬂation and con-
sumption makes a nominal bond risky (since it has a low real return when consumption
is low), so investors ask for a risk premium. The moments in (2) are conditional and
possibly time-varying.
The real (inﬂation indexed) bonds have occasionally been somewhat illiquid assets
and it is often argued that they carry a liquidity premium (for instance, see Shen (2006)).
3Let r indicate the real interest rate observed in data and let LPR indicate the real liquidity
premium. Clearly, r D Q r C LPR, so the Fisher equation can (after dropping the Jensen’s
inequality term) be written
i   r   E D   Cov.;c/   
inﬂation risk premium
  LPR: (3)
The “total premium” (i   r   E) depends positively on the inﬂation risk premium cap-
tured by the ﬁrst term and negatively on the liquidity premium on real bonds. (To be
more precise, LPR can be interpreted as the difference between the liquidity premia on
nominal and real bonds.)
Central banks often calculate a “break-even inﬂation” as the difference between nom-
inal and real yields (i   r)—with the purpose of approximating the market’s inﬂation
expectation. If the inﬂation risk premium and the liquidity premium in the Fisher equa-
tion (3) are constant, then the break-even inﬂation differs from the inﬂation expectations
by a constant: changes in the break-even inﬂation are then precise measures of changes
in inﬂation expectations. Otherwise, an increased inﬂation risk premium increases the
break-even inﬂation rate, while an increased real liquidity premium decreases it—and
these movements may hurt the informational value of the break-even inﬂation.
The plan of this paper is to ﬁnd proxies for the inﬂation risk premium and the real
liquidity premium—in order to understand the pricing of bonds and to improve upon the
practice of calculating the break-even inﬂation rate.
3 Data and Relation to the Fisher Equation
This section describes the data and how it is used to construct proxies for macroeconomic
uncertainty and liquidity premia.
3.1 Data
I use McCulloch’s (2008) end of month estimates of nominal and real zero coupon rates,
quarterly data on subjective beliefs from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF)
at the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (2008) and the daily proxy for the liquidity
premium from the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland (2008). The effective sample is
quarterly and covers the period 1997Q1–2008Q2: the starting point is due to the intro-
4duction of the TIPS (Treasury Inﬂation-Protected Securities) in 1997Q1 and the end point
to the discontinuation of the liquidity premium data in autumn 2008 (see below).
The SPF is a quarterly survey of forecasters’ views on key economic variables. The
respondents, who supply anonymous answers, are professional forecasters from the busi-
ness and ﬁnancial community. The survey is since 1991 administered by the Federal Re-
serve Bank of Philadelphia (see Croushore (1993) for details). It asks for point forecasts
ofmanymacroeconomicandﬁnancialvariables, butalsoforprobabilitydistributions(his-
tograms) of real output growth and GDP deﬂator inﬂation. The deadline for the survey is
approximately in the middle of the quarter.
The survey data from the SPF is very interesting, but far from perfect for investigat-
ing the empirical relevance of the (modern) Fisher equation. It is therefore necessary to
discuss the compromises that need to be made.
The Fisher equation (2) applies to an individual investor: it is his/her ﬁrst order con-
dition. However, the survey asks about macroeconomic aggregates, not the respondent’s
own consumption—and the forecasters in the SPF do not agree (especially not about the
point forecasts). A solution to this problem is found in the asset pricing literature on
heterogenous beliefs: it suggests that the difference between (planned) individual and
aggregate consumption is a function of the disagreement between investors.1 For this rea-
son, measures of disagreement about the point forecasts of inﬂation and real growth will
be included in the empirical analysis. Another reason for including disagreement is that
it is often thought of as an alternative proxy for uncertainty.
The survey data has a number code for each respondent, so it is possible to estimate
the Fisher equation on individual data.2 However, there are several problems with that
approach—in particular with how to handle outliers and other strange data points (dis-
cussed below). Instead, I estimate a Fisher equation on cross-sectional averages (trimmed
means or medians) of all the terms. This is a valid way of doing it, since the ﬁrst order
condition (using disagreement to proxy for the difference between individual and aggre-
gate consumption) should hold for each investor—and therefore for an average. It might
sacriﬁce a bit of econometric efﬁciency, but makes it easier to handle outliers.
The SPF contains only univariate distributions, and hence no information about the
covariance of inﬂation and consumption that enters (3). I therefore approximate the co-
1See, for instance, Anderson, Ghysel, and Juergens (2005), David (2008) and Söderlind (2008).
2This gives a dynamic panel regression since the participants enter and leave the survey at different
times.
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Figure 1: Liquidity premium according to the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland (2008).
This ﬁgure shows a 4-quarter moving average of the liquidity premium on off-the-run
nominal bonds, the functional form of equation (4) and the resulting liquidity premium
on real bonds.
variance by a linear combination of the two standard deviations. One possible interpreta-
tion is that this is a Taylor series expansion.
To analyse long-term interest rates, we ought to have data on long-run uncertainty.
Unfortunately, the SPF asks only for short-run uncertainty. I am therefore left with using
the short-run information—hoping that long-run uncertainty can be proxied by (linear
functions of) short-term uncertainty.
The Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland (2008) calculates an adjusted break-even in-
ﬂation by adding a real liquidity premium (LPR)—that is, as i   .r   LPR/. The idea
is that the observed real interest rate (r) needs to be adjusted down to correct for the liq-
uidity risk premium of the real bonds. To construct this real liquidity premium (which is
not directly observable), Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland (2008) argues that it is likely
6to be strongly related to the yield difference between less and more liquid (“off-the-run”
and “on the run”) 10-year nominal Treasury bonds (denoted LPO below). The functional
form used is
LPR D  0:948 C 12:71LPO   20:9LPO
2: (4)
The negative constant is meant to capture a constant inﬂation risk premium of the nominal
bond, soLPR ismorethanjustarealliquiditypremium. Figure1showsthetimeseriesof
LPO, thefunctionalformofequation(4)withmarkersforthequartilesofthesample, and
the resulting time series of LPR. The ﬁrst and third subﬁgure illustrate that the liquidity
premia peak around 1999–2000 and 2002–2003 and are markedly low 2005–2007. The
second subﬁgure shows that the functional form of (4) is effectively linear with a slope of
approximately 3.5, except for some very rare cases (the peak in 1999). The publication
of the LPR was discontinued in the autumn 2008, which forces my sample to end in
2008Q2.3
I use LPO as a regressor together with my proxies for macro economic uncertainty.
In practice, this means that I try to replace the constant inﬂation risk premium in (4) with
time-varying proxies of inﬂation risk.
Based on these considerations, the main empirical speciﬁcation of the current paper is
to regress the total premium as











Notice that LPO enters the regression to capture the real liquidity premium, so I expect
a negative coefﬁcient. (The nominal interest rates used here are based on highly liquid
instruments.)
If the nominal interest rate and inﬂation expectations are non-stationary, but cointe-
grated (with a coefﬁcient of unity), then (5) is expressed in terms of stationary variables
(assuming, of course, that the real interest rate is stationary).
To summarize, a consumption-based asset pricing model (3) with heterogenous be-
liefs suggests that the nominal interest rate should be driven by the terms in (5). The
3On 31 October 2008 Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland (2008) states: “We have discontinued the
liquidity-adjusted TIPS expected inﬂation estimates for the time being. The adjustment was designed for
more normal liquidity premiums. We believe that the extreme rush to liquidity is affecting the accuracy of
the estimates.”
7coefﬁcients are essentially an empirical issue as they depend on several unknown param-
eters: the risk aversion coefﬁcient, the importance of disagreement and the properties of
the approximations. The rest of this section discusses how the variables in the regression
are constructed.
3.2 Construction of Variables Used in the Regressions
The 3- and 10-year nominal and real interest rates as well as the (median) inﬂation ex-
pectations are shown in Figure 2. There are substantial movements in all three variables,
except the 10-year inﬂation expectations which are virtually ﬂat after 1999. I choose
to focus on the horizons of 3 and 10 years: the real rates for shorter maturities are less
reliable—and it can be shown that the regression results for maturities between 3 and 10
years are well approximated by straightforward interpolation.
The 3- and 10-year inﬂation expectations are constructed from the median (across
forecasters) CPI inﬂation forecasts—by linear interpolation of the forecasts for the next
calendar year and for the next 10 years.
The upper panel of Figure 3 compares the break-even inﬂation expectation (i   r) to
the survey forecasts of inﬂation (E), and the lower panel shows the difference between
them—that is, the “total premium” (i   r   E). There are marked cyclical swings in
the total premia and they are strongly correlated across maturities with a peak in 1997,
2000, 2004–8 and very low values in 1999 and 2002–3. As discussed earlier, the approach
of this paper is to investigate if the movements of the total premia can be explained by
macroeconomic uncertainty and a liquidity premium.
The uncertainty of deﬂator inﬂation and output growth is estimated by ﬁtting distri-
butions to the individual histograms in the SPF. The estimation procedure is as follows.
If only one bin is used (the respondent puts 100% of the probability on one of the pre-
speciﬁed bins), then I assume a triangular distribution within that bin. If two or more bins
are used, then a normal distribution is estimated (a mean and a variance) by minimizing
the sum of the squared deviations of the theoretical from the observed probabilities. (See
Giordani and Söderlind (2003) for an early application and Garcíaand Manzanares (2007)
for a critique of the least squares criterion.)
There is a lot of cross-sectional (across forecasters) dispersion in the ﬁtted values
from the individual histograms—some of which appears to be caused by typos and other
data errors. To get robust estimates of the average individual uncertainty, I use the cross-
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Figure 2: Interest rates (nominal and real) and inﬂation expectations. This ﬁgure shows
estimated nominal and real zero coupon rates from McCulloch’s homepage, as well as
inﬂation expectations from the SPF.
sectional trimmed mean (20% trimming from both bottom and top) of the individual stan-
dard deviations. (Using the median gives very similar results and using the mean produces
fairly similar, but more erratic results.)
The probability distributions (histograms) of real output growth and inﬂation are for
year-on-year data (the value in a calendar year divided by the value in the previous cal-
endar year, minus one). This means that the forecasting horizon varies across the sample:
the current (next) year forecast made in Q1 has a four (eight) quarter horizon, the forecast
made in Q2 has a three (seven) quarter horizon and so forth. The estimated uncertainty
therefore has clear seasonality—as the effective forecasting horizon decreases over the
calendar year. The rest of the paper will therefore focus on results where all series are
4-quarter moving averages (using an X12 approach gives similar results).
Disagreement (about inﬂation and real growth) is measured by the inter-quartile range
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Figure 3: Interest rates (nominal and real) and inﬂation expectations. This ﬁgure shows
various combinations of estimated nominal and real zero coupon rates from McCulloch,
as well as inﬂation expectations from the SPF.
(divided by 1.35) of the individual point forecasts. This is a robust estimator of the
cross-sectional dispersion—and would coincide with the standard deviation if the cross-
sectional distribution were Gaussian. (Using a cross-sectional standard error produces
a very erratic time series, due to occasional strange forecasts.) Similar to the estimates
of uncertainty, there is a distinct seasonal pattern in disagreement (driven by the time-
variation in the forecasting horizon).
The upper panel of Figure 4 shows uncertainty (estimated from the histograms) about
inﬂation and real growth for the current and next calendar year. The lower panel shows
disagreement (estimated from the cross-sectional dispersion of the point forecasts) about
the same variables. There are signiﬁcant movements in these data series, with some
interesting patterns. First, the results for year 1 and year 2 convey virtually the same
information. The uncertainty about the next calendar year is of course higher, but the


























Figure 4: Uncertainty and disagreement about inﬂation and real growth. Uncertainty is
estimated by the trimmed (20% at both ends) cross-sectional mean of the individual stan-
dard deviations of year-on-year GDP deﬂator inﬂation and output growth. The individual
standard deviations are estimated from the individual SPF histograms. Disagreement is
estimated by the inter-quartile range (divided by 1.35) of the individual point forecasts of
CPI and real growth. All data is in the form of 4-quarter moving averages.
correlation of year 1 and 2 is very strong (around 0.7 for both variables). In addition,
inﬂation disagreement is almost the same for both years and the two series for real growth
disagreement are also strongly correlated (around 0.8). Second, inﬂation uncertainty
and disagreement are strongly correlated (around 0.7). Third, real growth uncertainty
and disagreement are less correlated (around 0.3) and the disagreement series looks very
jumpy. Fourth, inﬂation and real growth uncertainty are only mildly correlated (around
0.4). Thesefeatureswillbeimportantfortheempiricalresultsreportedinthenextsection.


























Figure 5: Total premium and the key regressors. This ﬁgure shows the total premium
(i   r   E), liquidity premium, inﬂation uncertainty and real growth uncertainty. All
data is in the form of 4-quarter moving averages.
4 Empirical Results
This section reports the empirical results for quarterly data from 1997Q1 to 2008Q2 for
the 3- and 10-year maturities. It can be shown that results for intermediate maturities are
well approximated by linear interpolation. All data is in the form of 4-quarter moving
averages—as a simple way to handle the strong seasonality in the survey data on uncer-
tainty and disagreement (caused by the time variation in the effective forecasting horizon).
Regressions on seasonally adjusted data give very similar results, but somewhat lower R2
values.
Figure 5 shows the total premium (i   r   E) and some of the key regressors. Only
regressor values for year 1 are shown and used in the subsequent analysis, since the data
for year 2 contributes very little extra information (compare Figure 4) and since the data
12for year 1 appears to be somewhat more reliable (in particular, it has fewer suspicious
histograms).









constant 0:27 1:53 0:92 0:84
.2:74/ .1:76/ .3:66/ .8:02/
R2 0:63 0:18 0:40 0:73
obs 43:00 43:00 43:00 43:00
Table 1: Regression results, total premium for the 10-year maturity. The table shows re-
gression coefﬁcients and t-statistics (in parentheses) for quarterly data 1997Q1–2008Q2.
The dependent variable is the nominal interest rate minus the real interest rate and minus
expectedinﬂation(10-yearhorizon). Thet-statisticsarebasedonaNewey-Westestimator
with 4 lags.
4.1 Explaining the Observed Total Premium with the Liquidity Premium
The potential of the off-the-run liquidity premium to ﬁt the total premium (i   r   E)
is clear from the upper panel of Figure 5: the total premium and the off-the-run liquidity
premium appear to be strongly negatively correlated. This is consistent with the inter-
pretation (by Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland (2008)) that the off-the-run liquidity
premium is a reasonable proxy for the real liquidity premium—and should therefore be
negatively related to the total premium.
This is veriﬁed by the ﬁrst column of Table 1 which reports results from an OLS
regression of the 10-year total premium on the off-the-run liquidity premium (and a con-
stant). The t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on a Newey-West estimator of the co-
variance matrix with 4 lags, to account for the autocorrelation that is potentially induced
by using 4-quarter moving averages. The slope coefﬁcient is signiﬁcantly negative, with
13a value ( 4:6) that ﬁts well with the slope of the functional form of (4) as previously
illustrated in Figure 1, and the R2 is high. This conﬁrms the usefulness of the off-the-run
liquidity premium.
It can be shown that the off-the-run liquidity premium is correlated with several of the
other potential regressors. In particular, it is strongly correlated with real growth uncer-
tainty and disagreement (correlation coefﬁcients of 0.50–0.75). It is also strongly corre-
lated with CBOE’s volatility index VIX (0.80), which is an average of implied volatilities
from stock options—and should therefore provide a summary measure of the market’s
belief about future stock market volatility. In contrast, the off-the-run liquidity premium
is only weakly (and negatively) correlated with inﬂation uncertainty and disagreement.
Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that the off-the-run premium, uncertainty and dis-
agreement about real growth and the VIX all are proxies of the general level of liquidity
premia on the bond markets, while inﬂation uncertainty and disagreement represent some-
thing else.
Columns 2–4 of Table 1 report results from regressing the total premium on these
other proxies for the liquidity premium (one at a time). All have negatives signs and
are signiﬁcant—and it is hard to tell which of them is the best proxy (for instance, VIX
actually gives a higher R2 than the off-the-run liquidity premium).
However, the off-the-run premium is by now well established by the Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland (2008) and it has the advantage of focusing on the liquidity on the
Treasury bond market, rather than general ﬁnancial uncertainty. I will therefore keep it in
the subsequent regressions—but add other variables.
4.2 Adding Proxies for Macroeconomic Uncertainty/Disagreement
Table 2 reports results from a number of regressions of the 10-year total premium based
on model (5). The ﬁrst column shows that both inﬂation uncertainty and disagreement
have signiﬁcantly positive effects on the total premium, output growth uncertainty has a
signiﬁcantly negative effect while real growth disagreement has a small and insigniﬁcant
coefﬁcient. The latter variable is dropped in the second column and all further regressions
(it is almost invariably insigniﬁcant in these and other regressions). The off-the-run liq-
uidity premium still has a negative effect, although it is now only borderline signiﬁcant.
The R2 is 0.78, which is signiﬁcantly higher (at the 5% level) than the 0.63 obtained from
using only the liquidity premium (see Table 1).
14The remaining columns in Table 2 report results when some further variables are
dropped. In short, the results are that inﬂation uncertainty and disagreement are close
substitutes (columns 3 and 4), that dropping output uncertainty lowers the R2 a bit (col-
umn 5), but that dropping the liquidity premium does less so (column 6).
One interpretation of the results in Table 2 is that (i) uncertainty/disagreement about
inﬂation induces an “inﬂation risk premium” and (ii) output growth uncertainty and the
off-the-run liquidity premium together capture the liquidity premium on real bonds (sim-
ilar to the ﬁnding in Table 1).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
./ 2:57 2:46 4:09 2:02 3:27
.2:53/ .2:58/ .4:20/ .2:69/ .3:13/
Dis./ 1:51 1:48 2:09 2:13
.3:35/ .3:47/ .4:46/ .3:56/
.y/  4:49  4:38  3:56  3:32  6:71
. 2:97/ . 2:88/ . 2:08/ . 2:04/ . 9:31/
Dis.c/ 0:19
.0:30/
LPO  2:17  2:04  2:42  2:85  4:28
. 1:88/ . 1:90/ . 2:04/ . 2:58/ . 5:19/
constant 0:27 0:36 0:88  0:19  0:72 0:60
.0:39/ .0:69/ .1:38/ . 0:38/ . 2:05/ .1:08/
R2 0:78 0:78 0:75 0:73 0:67 0:73
obs 43:00 43:00 43:00 43:00 43:00 43:00
Table 2: Regression results, total premium for the 10-year maturity. The table shows re-
gression coefﬁcients and t-statistics (in parentheses) for quarterly data 1997Q1–2008Q2.
The dependent variable is the nominal interest rate minus the real interest rate and minus
expectedinﬂation(10-yearhorizon). Thet-statisticsarebasedonaNewey-Westestimator
with 4 lags.
The results for the 3-year horizon in Table 3 are similar, with a few exceptions.
First, inﬂation uncertainty is never signiﬁcant if inﬂation disagreement is included in the
regression—highlighting their substitutability. Second, the liquidity premium is even less
signiﬁcant than before. Third, the R2 values are generally lower. Still, the overall results
are the same as for the 10-year horizon, but perhaps somewhat weaker.
To illustrate the economic importance of the results, consider (for example) the re-
15(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
./ 1:06 0:51 3:61 0:42 1:23
.0:49/ .0:29/ .2:31/ .0:27/ .0:68/
Dis./ 2:98 2:82 2:94 3:39
.3:64/ .3:16/ .4:19/ .3:80/
.y/  7:66  7:14  6:97  5:12  9:22
. 3:10/ . 2:87/ . 2:71/ . 1:89/ . 5:52/
Dis.c/ 0:95
.0:90/
LPO  2:43  1:82  1:90  3:35  5:56
. 1:31/ . 1:04/ . 1:10/ . 1:87/ . 3:36/
constant 1:54 2:00 2:11 0:96 0:14 2:22
.1:02/ .1:66/ .1:96/ .0:88/ .0:18/ .1:87/
R2 0:65 0:63 0:63 0:55 0:48 0:61
obs 43:00 43:00 43:00 43:00 43:00 43:00
Table 3: Regression results, total premium for the 3-year maturity. The table shows re-
gression coefﬁcients and t-statistics (in parentheses) for quarterly data 1997Q1–2008Q2.
The dependent variable is the nominal interest rate minus the real interest rate and minus
expected inﬂation (3-year horizon). The t-statistics are based on a Newey-West estimator
with 4 lags.
gression results for the 10-year maturity in column 4 of Table 2, which can be written
(disregarding the residual)





LPR D 3:32.y/   E.y/ C 2:85LPO   ELPO
IP D 4:09./   E./:
Compared to the table, all means are moved to the intercept (), which therefore is the
average total premium. I also interpret the inﬂation uncertainty term as the (demeaned)
inﬂation risk premium of the nominal interest rate (IP), and the real growth uncertainty
and off-the-run liquidity premium as capturing the (demeaned) liquidity premium of the
real interest rate (LPR). The motivation for rewriting the equation in terms of demeaned
variables is that the average values of the inﬂation and liquidity premia cannot be sepa-
rately identiﬁed from the regression (only the sum of them—in the form of the intercept
16)—so the discussion here is focused on their movements.
Figure 6 illustrates this decomposition. The upper left subﬁgure shows that the ﬁtted
values capture the main movements of the total premium (i   r   E)—indeed, the R2
is 0.73. The upper right subﬁgure shows the inﬂation risk premium and (the negative of)
the real liquidity premium. There are clear movements in both components—and they
suggest the following story for the movements of the total premium. The trough in 1999–
2000 is due to a high real liquidity premium: both output uncertainty and off-the-run
liquidity premia are high then (see Figure 5). The real liquidity premium falls back over
the next year (mostly because of the off-the-run liquidity premium), creating a local peak
in the total premium 2001. The moderately low total premium in 2002–2004 is similar
to the trough in 1999–2000 (that is, mostly driven by a high liquidity premium), except
that the increase in the inﬂation risk premium prevents the total premium from falling
very much. The very high total premium 2004–2007 is initially driven by a low liquidity
premium (in spite of a falling inﬂation risk premium)—and later increased further by a
higher inﬂation risk premium. Towards the end of the sample (2008), there is a tendency
for the total premium to decrease due to an increasing liquidity premium.
The lower panel of Figure 6 illustrates how these results would adjust the break-even
inﬂation rate. The idea is based on (6) which can also be written as
i   r    C LPR   IP D E: (7)
In the lower left subﬁgure, I compare a mean-adjusted break-even rate that is only mean
adjusted (i  r  ) and one that incorporates also the real liquidity premium (i  r  C
LPR). The mean-adjusted rate is clearly just a vertical shift of the unadjusted break-even
(i  r) previously shown in Figure 3. In contrast, adding the real liquidity premium makes
the break-even inﬂation rate smoother: the troughs and peaks are less dramatic—making
the curve look more similar to the (very ﬂat) survey inﬂation expectations (previously
shown in Figure 3). In the lower right subﬁgure, also the effect of the inﬂation risk pre-
mium (IP) is subtracted. This increases the break-even inﬂation rate 1999–2002 (since
the inﬂation risk premium is low) and decreases it 2003–2005 and 2007–2008 (when the
inﬂation risk premium is high).











Effect of infl risk and Liq premia
(−) LPR
IR     





i−r−µ    
i−r−µ+LPR





i−r−µ+LPR   
i−r−µ+LPR−IR
Figure 6: Total premium and the effect of key regressors (demeaned), 10-year maturity.
This ﬁgure shows the total premium (i  r  E), the (demeaned) inﬂation risk premium
and (the negative of) the real liquidity premium deﬁned in (6, and various adjustments of
the break-even inﬂation rate deﬁned in (7. All data is in the form of 4-quarter moving
averages.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper tries to explain the observed “total premium” (the difference between nom-
inal and real interest rates, minus survey data on inﬂation expectations) by the nomi-
nal off-the-run liquidity premium as well as survey data on inﬂation and output uncer-
tainty/disagreement. It is found that these variables are statistically and economically sig-
niﬁcant. Inﬂation uncertainty and uncertainty seem to capture an inﬂation risk premium,
while the nominal off-the-run liquidity premium and real growth uncertainty together
capture the real liquidity premium. This leads to important adjustments of the break-even
inﬂation rate.
18There are several caveats, however. The sample is short, has only a quarterly fre-
quency and must be seasonally adjusted. The reasons are (respectively) that data on real
interest rates starts only in 1997Q1, the survey data is quarterly and it has a forecasting
horizon that varies over the calendar year.
In spite of these limitations, it is interesting to study a modern Fisher equation where
we have at least proxies for the terms that asset pricing theory suggests. The empirical
results are encouraging since they suggest plausible effects of macroeconomic uncertainty
on nominal interest rates.
I hope that this paper contributes to the understanding of the economic factors behind
the inﬂation risk and liquidity premia. It could also be of help to central bank staff and
others who need to adjust break-even inﬂation rates. Further research might be able to
ﬁnd high-frequency proxies for inﬂation and output uncertainty/disagreement and thereby
further improve current practices.
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